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Learning from Military Transformations

Lessons Unlearned: Army Transformation
and Low-Intensity Conflict
Pat Proctor
ABSTRACT: This article examines the US Army’s experiences
and lessons learned during military interventions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo. It explores why these lessons did not
affect the Army transformation, directed in the late-1990s by James
M. Dubik, John W. Hendrix, John N. Abrams, and Eric K. Shinseki.

M

ilitary interventions in the Balkans during the late 1990s
demonstrated the US Army was ill-prepared for low-intensity
conflicts.1 Likewise, a growing chorus of critics warned
the future portended not Gulf War-style, high-intensity conflicts but
an increasing number of low-intensity conflicts.2 Army transformers,
steeped in a culture that emphasized preparation to fight high-intensity
conflicts over all other activities, ignored these warnings and continued
the Army’s “transformation” toward an even more deployable, high-tech,
networked force built to fight two nearly simultaneous “major regional
contingencies” (high-intensity conflicts against conventional adversaries).
This transformation culminated in the creation of interim brigade
combat teams (BCTs). In the end, however, the two “major regional
contingencies” America would fight were not against conventional
adversaries but against insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, the US
Army was unprepared to fight them.
The Army of the early 1990s was still basking in the glow of
Operation Desert Storm, the stunningly successful liberation of Kuwait
from the Iraqi Army.3 The surprising results of the Persian Gulf War
seemed to validate the Army’s high-tech, post-Vietnam War approach to
rebuilding—supplanting the superior numbers of the Soviet Army with
superior American technology.4 The focus of Army transformers in the
wake of the Gulf War was how to fight similar future conflicts better
by exploiting information technology in what was commonly referred
to as a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). Transformers predicted
that, in future wars, the Army would have “near ‘perfect,’ near-real-time

1      The term “low-intensity conflict” refers to operations ranging from humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief to counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations. This is an imperfect choice,
but I have chosen to avoid terms such as operations other than war, military operations other than
war, or stability and support operations—in vogue during the period this study considers. Of course,
“low-intensity conflict” comes with its own baggage, but other terms, such as “small wars” miss the
fact that such operations might be large yet still have a character quite distinct from that of highintensity conflicts.
2      The term “high-intensity conflict” describes combat against a conventional military force of
industrial-age or greater technological ability.
3      Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 3027–40, Kindle.
4      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 167–78.
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intelligence . . . sufficient lethality with precision strike systems, and
massing of lethal effects” to defeat any adversary.5
But the reviews for Desert Storm were not all glowing. Army
transformers were concerned about taking nearly half a year to buildup
sufficient logistics, equipment, and combat forces to eject Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait. And, if the ground war had continued much
longer than 100 hours, the Army might well have run out of critical
supplies such as fuel and spare parts.6 Transformers believed the Army
had to become more deployable and more sustainable.
Yet transformation would occur in the context of shrinking budgets
and a shrinking force. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Congress
cashed in the “peace dividend”; defense spending fell and the Army
shrank from 2.1 million soldiers before Desert Storm to 1.4 million
soldiers by the end of the drawdown in the mid-1990s.7 The Army stood
down four of 16 divisions and eliminated one corps in Europe.8
Moreover, while the Army was shrinking, the demands upon it
were increasing dramatically. Between 1988 and 1992, the US military
participated in 12 separate United Nations peacekeeping or humanitarian
missions.9 By 1994, nearly 21,000 soldiers were operating in 70 different
countries.10 The National Defense University’s Project 2025 concluded
the future held more of the same “demographic pressures, religious and
ethnic passions, and environmental constraints [that would] continue
to encroach upon and at times threaten [US] interests.”11 The future
seemed to promise not high-intensity, Gulf War-style conflicts but a
growing number of low-intensity conflicts.
And more low-intensity conflicts did come. In the final days of
his presidency, George H. W. Bush sent American forces to Somalia
to assist a teetering humanitarian assistance mission led by the United
Nations. Under President Bill Clinton, the mission in Somalia expanded
until 1,200 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division and the 75th
Ranger Regiment were engaged in what General Anthony Zinni,
US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, would later call
a “counterinsurgency operation, or . . . some form of war.”12 In the
cataclysmic, 17-hour battle (October 3–4, 1993) immortalized in the
book and movie Blackhawk Down, 84 American soldiers were wounded
and 18 were killed along with 500 or more Somalis. The US forces were
unceremoniously withdrawn five months later.13
5      Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Reader’s Guide: FM 100-5, 1986–1993 Comparison (Fort
Monroe, VA: Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC],
[1993]), 1.
6      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 2994–98.
7      Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military
History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 11766–70, 11805–13,
12157–72, Kindle.
8         Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12157–72.
9         Millet, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12124–34.
10      Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994), 13.
   11      Institute for National Strategic Studies Project 2025 (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1992), 61–63.
12      “Ambush in Mogadishu,” Frontline, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/ambush/interviews/zinni.html.
13        Shimko, Iraq Wars, 2888–901; Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12260–98.
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The disastrous outcome of the war in Somalia should have caused
the Army to question the limitations of the RMA-fueled transformation
in which it was engaged.14 Instead, the debate over the lessons of Somalia
became embroiled in political recriminations. Defense Secretary Les
Aspin Jr. was blamed for—and later resigned over—his failure to send
armor to Somalia. The Clinton administration was blamed for mission
creep. And Samuel Huntington led a chorus of national security experts
questioning the wisdom of “nation building.”15
Meanwhile, the Army continued to march headlong toward
ever more optimized, networked, high-precision capabilities. The
Department of Defense undertook a bottom-up review that predictably
concluded the US military needed to be prepared to fight two major
regional contingencies—large, high-intensity conflicts.16 To prepare for
these conflicts, the future Army began prototyping and experimentation
with Force XXI, the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas.17
Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan predicted
the future force would “be able to locate enemy forces quickly and
precisely,” distribute that information “among all committed forces,”
and “observe, decide, and act faster, more correctly and more precisely”
than the enemy.18 This force would also fix the Army’s deployability
problems by better “projecting and sustaining combat power.”19 The
concept paid lip service to the need to fight across the range of military
operations—against enemies ranging from “agrarian war lords” and
“industrial armies” to an “Information Age peer”—but was clearly
designed to dominate a high-intensity conflict environment.20 The
unspoken assumption was that an Army that excelled at high-intensity
conflict would have no problem operating in a low-intensity conflict.
Low-intensity conflict, on the other hand, was a neglected area of
US military thought in the early 1990s. The Army’s concept of lowintensity conflict—captured in Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict,
Field Manual (FM) 100-20, and Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, FM
7-98—had serious flaws, such as an epigraph stating “peacekeeping isn’t
a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”21
Army doctrine on low-intensity conflict also suffered from the
contemporary relegation of insurgency and counterinsurgency to
special operations forces (SOF). Restricted by Congress’s post-Vietnam
aversion to military interventions, the Reagan-era model for insurgency
14      Shimko, Iraq Wars, 3027–40.
15      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12260–98.
16      John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the US Army, 1989–2005 (Washington,
DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2011), 1989–2005, Kindle.
17      John L. Romjue, Susa Canedy and Anne W. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for War: A
Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998 (Fort Monroe, VA:
TRADOC, 1998), 31–32.
18      Sullivan and Dubik, War in the Information Age, 15.
19      See Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Decisive Victory: America’s Power
Projection Army, white paper (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 1994), 8–9.
20      HQDA, Decisive Victory, 11; Sullivan and Dubik, War in the Information Age, 15; and Shimko,
Iraq Wars, 3504–3507.
21      John B. Hunt, “OOTW: A Concept in Flux,” Military Review 76, no. 5 (September–October
1996): 3–10; HQDA, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Field Manual (FM) 100-20 (Washington,
DC: HQDA, 1990); and HQDA, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, FM 7-98 (Washington, DC:
HQDA, 1992), 4-1–4-9. This quote has been attributed in various sources to former UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld or military sociologist Charles Moskos.
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and counterinsurgency in places like Honduras and El Salvador was to
use small special forces elements. This SOF mission was codified by
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.22 The
US Army abdicated responsibility for insurgency and counterinsurgency
to SOF through the manuals, which proclaimed the activities were
tasks best reserved for the elite units and that America’s proper role in
counterinsurgency was only to support a host nation.23 This philosophy
dangerously assumed a host nation existed and had the capability to
combat an insurgency.
Counterinsurgency receded even more from Army doctrine during
1993: counterinsurgency was not even listed with other operations that
occur in “conflict” environments, the ill-defined gray area between
war and peace.24 The dubious phrase “operations other than war” also
replaced “low-intensity conflict.”25
Justifying this diminution of low-intensity conflict in favor of a
laser focus on exploiting the RMA to prosecute high-intensity conflicts
better, Sullivan argued “we cannot optimize the force for a single threat.
We must instead build a force with the capability to win in the most
important contingencies, while retaining the versatility, flexibility, and
residual force to win across the range of uncertainty inherent in our
forecasts of the future.”26 Elsewhere, he wrote “nation-building is not
an Army issue, but the Army is prepared to support those agencies of
the government which are directly concerned with that task.”27 He also
declared, “The Army exists to fight and win the nation’s wars.”28 This perspective sheds much light on “operations other than war” replacing “lowintensity conflict” in Army doctrine. Rather than “nation-building,”
high-intensity conflicts were “the most important contingencies.”29
Low-intensity conflicts were an unwelcome but unavoidable tax on
Army resources.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Yugoslavia shattered along
ethnic and religious lines into four separate countries.30 In and around
Bosnia and Herzegovina, militia forces and criminal gangs—armed
with everything from small arms to armored vehicles from the former
Yugoslav army—engaged in brutal acts of ethnic violence against each
other as well as murder and ethnic cleansing against civilian populations.
These actions killed as many as 250,000 people and rendered over 2
million more people refugees or internally displaced.31
As the fighting grew, so did concern in European capitals that the
fighting might spread to the neighboring Balkan states. In February
1992, in an effort to halt the fighting, the United Nations established
22      David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam
to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 79–81.
23      FM 7-98, 3-2.
24      FM 100-5, 2-0–2-1.
25      Hunt, “OOTW.”
26      Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, “The Challenges of Peace,” Parameters 24, no.
3 (Autumn 1994): 4–17.
27      Sullivan and Twomey, “Challenges of Peace.”
28      HQDA, Decisive Victory, 2.
29      Sullivan and Twomey, “Challenges of Peace.”
30      Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 2–3.
31      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 1, 4.
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a multinational protection force that eventually assigned 38,000
troops, from 37 countries, across more than 7,000 bases in the former
Yugoslavia. But the weak mandate for the force, its lack of cohesion, and
the potpourri of caveats from the contributing nations rendered this
force impotent; it was largely a spectator to the violence rather than an
enforcer of the peace.32
No ethnic or religious group was innocent in the conflict; all engaged
in violence against civilians and ethnic cleansing. But the Bosnian Serbs
were guilty of some of the worst atrocities of the war, including the
murder of 7,000–8,000 Bosniaks at Srebrenica in full view of Dutch
peacekeepers, 100 of which were taken prisoner.33
In 1994, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) began to escalate military pressure gradually—
primarily through air strikes. In December 1995, the warring parties
signed the Dayton Accords, ending the fighting and delineating lines
between the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.34 A provision
of the Dayton Accords was an international Implementation Force
(IFOR) that would, among other things, establish and enforce a zone of
separation, protect the civilian populace, and create the conditions for
reestablishing civil governance.35
The NATO force had a much more robust mandate and many fewer
national caveats than the UN effort; with the additional effectiveness,
the Implementation Force could compel compliance from each faction.
V Corps Commander, and future commander of US Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Lieutenant General John N.
Abrams commanded US Army Europe (USAREUR) (Forward) in
Bosnia.36 The core of the US contingent, Task Force Eagle, was the
division headquarters for the 1st Armored Division with two armored
brigades, an aviation brigade, and attached enablers such as engineers,
field artillery, military intelligence, and military police. Altogether,
the United States contributed 17,500 troops to the 60,000 soldiers of
the IFOR.37
The US support to Bosnia and Herzegovina during Operation
Joint Endeavor looks eerily similar to the stability phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The Balkan state was divided into three multinational
divisions. American forces assumed control of the northern region
and assumed varying degrees of authority over forces from countries
including Russia, Turkey, Poland, and Denmark.38 Prior to deployment,
US forces went through rigorous training, including a “mission readiness
exercise” at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels,
Germany.39 After arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Task Force
32      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 27.
33      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 27–28, 50; and Millett, Maslowski, and
Feis, Common Defense, 12378–96.
34      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12366–75, 12403; and Baumann, Gawrych, and
Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 29–30.
35      US Army Europe (USAREUR), Military Operations: The US Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Army in Europe (AE) Pamphlet 525-100 (Heidleberg, Germany: USAREUR, 2003), 16.
36      USAREUR, AE Pamphlet 525-100, 16-17.
37      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 37, 94, 120.
38      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 20–21; and Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 94.
39      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 12–13.
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Eagle executed operations and logistics from forward operating bases.
Units tried to balance force protection with the need to interact with
the population, developing a tactic of four-vehicle convoy operations.
Intelligence personnel and linguists were always in short supply.40
Army leaders raised in the doctrine and tactics of high-intensity
conflict struggled to meet the intellectual challenge of operating in an
environment where mission success required dealing with civilians,
establishing civil governance, practicing the “art of street diplomacy,”
and exercising a nuanced application of force under strict rules of
engagement. Officers struggled to untangle a complex web of history
and family ties, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts, to weave together
a political, economic, and social solution. Young platoon leaders and
company commanders were called upon to balance intimidation and
negotiations, dismantle illegal militia checkpoints, and understand and
interpret their mandate from vague international accords drafted by
diplomats half a world away. And as soon as a unit finally understood its
area of operations and how to do all of these things, it rotated out to be
replaced by the next unit.41
Yet instead of addressing its unpreparedness to fight a low-intensity
conflict, the US Army focused on what Operation Joint Endeavor
revealed about continued problems with the deployability of the
Army. Moving more than 9,000 people and 20,000 short tons of US
equipment into Bosnia and Herzegovina had required nearly 400 trains
with more than 7,000 railcars; 1,400 sorties of cargo aircraft; 400 buses;
and 200 commercial truck convoys; as well as 42 military convoys. The
deployment was further complicated by flooding along the Sava River
on December 28, 1995.42
During that year a Congressional panel, on the roles and missions of
the Armed Forces, concluded that peace operations and operations other
than war ranked among the four most “significant security challenges
and opportunities in the years ahead.”43 The Joint Force’s response to
this commission report, Joint Vision 2010, was a defiant reaffirmation of
the RMA and the US military’s focus on high-intensity conflict.44 Joint
Vision 2010 was even more explicit than the Army XXI vision in arguing
that operations other than war were a lesser included military activity
for “forces optimized for wartime effectiveness.”45 But, more important,
Joint Vision 2010 posited an idea that became a focal point of the debate
over transformation well into the Iraq War: future adversaries would seek
“asymmetry” by using “information technology” to negate US military
advantages rather than duplicate them capability-for-capability.46
General Dennis J. Reimer assumed his duties as the 33rd Chief of
Staff of the Army in June 1995 and immediately endorsed the Army’s
high-intensity conflict focus. Reimer continued to build Force XXI
40      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 95–96.
41      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, i–iii, 126–27.
42      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 17–20.
43      Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense: Report of the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense,
1995), ES-4; and Millett and Maslowski, Common Defense, 12192–97.
44      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12192–97.
45      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: JCS, 1995), 17.
46      JCS, Joint Vision 2010, 10.
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and, in February 1996, began the Army After Next program, a series
of semiannual wargames augmented by continuous experimentation.47
Projecting to the year 2025, the Army After Next succeeded Force XXI
by achieving and maintaining “dominance” across every “domain” of
warfare—the “air-, land-, sea-, space-, and cyber-domains”—through
“knowledge and speed.”48
The fact that the human domain was conspicuously absent from the
concept was not lost on the growing chorus of transformation critics who
were beginning to question the Army’s approach. Commenting on the
insufficiency of current operations-other-than-war doctrine, Dr. John
W. Jandora, Special Operations Command, insisted “military planning
. . . must move beyond the Cold War mind-set and its preoccupation
with standing, conventional forces” to consider the social, economic,
and political aspects of the battlefield.49 Historian Jeffrey Record was
more direct in his criticism of transformation: “Our present strategy
portends an excessive readiness for the familiar and comfortable at the
expense of preparation for the more likely and less pleasant.”50
As the debate grew, urban operations became a focal point of
discussion. As early as 1995, scholars like Stephen Blank and Earl Tilford
began to point to the Russian debacle in Chechnya as an alarming
example of a modern military force humbled by guerilla forces fighting
in an urban environment, among a civilian population.51 But debate over
urban operations did not truly gain momentum until the Army After
Next project stumbled across the problem during a wargame at the US
Army War College.
A December 1998 report described the problem: every time the “red
team” (enemy) was faced with the technologically superior US force of
2025, it would “dive into cities.” The enemy chose this course “for both
operational and political ends.” The operational ends were to negate the
“advantages in speed and mobility” and “diminish the effect of a US
information advantage because forces are more difficult to locate, target,
and assess.” The political ends were to embroil the local population in
the conflict. The wargame report noted “urban operations will require a
much higher degree of integration with local societies than has been the
US experience heretofore.”52
This tactic was asymmetry rearing its head in a way that Joint Vision
2010 had not anticipated—the enemy forcing the Army to fight a lowintensity conflict. Major General Robert Scales, commandant of the US
Army War College, began to wrestle with this problem the following year.
47       Dennis J. Reimer, “Where We’ve Been—Where We’re Headed: Maintaining a Solid
Framework While Building for the Future,” Army, October 1995, reprinted in Soldiers Are Our
Credentials: The Collected Works and Selected Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff, United States Army, ed.
James Jay Carafano (Washington, DC: Center for Military History [CMH], 2000), 3; and Chapman
et al., Prepare the Army, 52.
48       TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the US Army of 2025 (Fort Monroe, VA:
TRADOC, 1998), 8–10.
49      John W. Jandora, “Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War,” Parameters 25, no. 1
(Spring 1995): 55–67.
50        Jeffrey Record, “Ready for What and Modernized against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on
Readiness and Modernization” (paper presented, annual strategy conference, US Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995), v.
51      Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr., Russia’s Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 12.
52      TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed, 19.
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Scales acknowledged cities presented a challenge to the Army because of
the “millions of people that house [the enemy’s] political, cultural, and
financial centers of gravity.” But his solution—sitting outside the city
and waiting for the enemy to quit—missed the most important facet of
this asymmetry: control of these “millions of people” and the “political,
cultural, and financial centers of gravity” they represented was essential
to the political ends that prompted US military intervention.53
Other Army transformers likewise tried to dismiss the problem of
urban operations. Army After Next experimenters Robert Hahn and
Bonnie Jezior prescribed a dizzying array of high-tech salves—from jet
packs to robots—for the urban operations problem.54 For these analysts,
cities were simply complicated terrain that obstructed movement and
obscured vision rather than complex, human environments essential to
the political purpose of future wars.
Lester Grau and Jacob Kipp, at the Command and Staff College,
would not let Army transformers wish away the problem of urban
operations: “Urban combat is increasingly likely, since high-precision
weapons threaten operational and tactical maneuver in open terrain.”
But their analysis continued to the heart of the “asymmetry” produced
by urban operations: enemies would choose to fight in cities because they
could “mobilize the city’s resources and population to their purposes.”
For Grau and Kipp the inescapable quality of a city that made it a difficult
and unavoidable military problem was the population of the city as the
political objective of war. In light of this central fact, they insisted, both
the Russian approach in Grozny—destroy the city—and the approach
suggested by Scales—avoid the city—suffered from “an utter disconnect
between the political objective. . . . and the military means.”55
The problem of urban operations was sufficiently dire to prompt
General John Abrams, commander, TRADOC, to commission
a study. The results, from the Combined Arms Center did not offer
Army transformers any solace. Roger Spiller echoed Grau’s and Kipp’s
argument that the essential property of a city was its nature as a “human
environment” and used historical examples to show how a city becomes
an even more complex problem as it begins to collapse under the stresses
of war. He quipped that Army transformers had taken to calling anything
they did not understand “asymmetry.” He added, “That asymmetric
warfare would be associated with urban warfare is significant.” He urged
the Army to stop the transformation until it could come to grips with
the problem of urban operations.56
Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed the depths of the Army’s
unpreparedness to fight in “human environment[s].”57 Despite promises
before the deployment that Operation Joint Endeavor would only last a
year, Army forces conducting operations other than war in the Balkans
53      Robert H. Scales Jr., Future Warfare: Anthology (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 200), 211.
54      Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,”
Parameters 29, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 74–86.
55      Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp, “Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter,” Military
Review 89, no. 3 (July–August 1999): 9–17.
56      Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End (Fort Leavenworth: US Army
Command and General Staff College, 2000).
57      Spiller, Sharp Corners.
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seemed to have no idea how to produce a durable political solution to
the conflict, and Bosnians of all factions feared the departure of international forces might lead to renewed fighting.58 The 1st Infantry Division
replaced the 1st Armored Division in November 1996, the mandate for
IFOR was extended, and the IFOR became the Stabilization Force.59 In
1997, General Eric K. Shinseki assumed command of the Stabilization
Force and the 1st Armored Division again assumed Task Force Eagle.60
They were followed by the 1st Cavalry Division and the 10th Mountain
Division before returning for a third rotation.61 The mission continued
until 2004, well into the Iraq War.62
Reflecting on his experience as a battalion commander in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Colonel Tony Cucolo, struck at the heart of the problem.
He wrote the “prevailing attitude among some senior leaders” was that
solving political problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina “was ‘out of [the
Army’s] lane.’ ”63 Rather than seeking a political solution, the Army’s
“measures of effectiveness,” to borrow a term from operations-otherthan-war doctrine, were avoiding US casualties, preventing wide-scale
ethnoreligious violence, and keeping the operation off of televisions
back in the United States. By these measures, Operation Joint Endeavor
was an overwhelming success.64
Brigadier General James Dubik confronted this problem in an
unpublished thought piece that he wrote in March 1999 while serving as
the deputy commander of operations for Task Force Eagle. Discussing
how to “reduce the time our military forces would have to be involved
or the size of the military force required after initial intervention” in
low-intensity conflicts, Dubik suggested the initial entry force in such
operations be followed by a hypothetical “national judicial force” that
would wrest the nonmilitary, illegal levers of power from the leaders that
the United States wished to supplant.65 It is telling that Dubik’s solution
to the problem was that some force other than the US Army should
arrive and assume the duty of navigating the political dimensions of the
low-intensity conflict. This idea would reemerge a few years later, when
he was charged with a critical element of Army transformation.
Professional Army critic Ralph Peters disagreed, insisting that
navigating the political dimension of low-intensity conflict was the Army’s
job—a job it refused to prepare to do: “Our military is determined to be
unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness
might prevent our going. We are like children who refuse to get dressed
for school.” Nonetheless, “when the President is out of options and key
58      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 121, 123.
59      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 21–22.
60      Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, 188, 204.
61      AE Pamphlet 525-100, 27.
62       Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers, iii; and Jim Garamone, “US
Peacekeepers Finish Bosnia Mission, Case Colors,” DoD, December 1, 2004, http://archive.defense
.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24700.
63      Tony Cucolo, “Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers,” Parameters
29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 110–26.
64      TRADOC, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, FM 100-23-1 (Fort
Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1994), 4-5–4-6.
65      James Dubik to LTG Thomas Burnett, thought paper, “Thought Paper-Similarities. Haiti and
Bosnia,” March 12, 1999, James M Dubik Papers, Bosnia and Herzegovina, folder 5—unpublished
thought papers, box 29—Task Force Eagle and Multinational Division North Operation Joint Forge,
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interest groups or foreign leaders are clamoring for American action, we
are going to go to school.” Peters added, “The military must be ready
for reality, not for its fantasy war.”66
While the debate between critics and transformers continued, events
developed in Serbia that dramatically impacted transformation and shortcircuited the debate. In March 1999, NATO began a sustained bombing
campaign aimed at ending Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s
ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. But, as the campaign wore on,
it became clear that bombing was not going to be sufficient. The Serbs
had adopted precisely the tactics transformation’s critics had envisioned;
among other tactics, the Serbian Army was hiding in urban centers
among the civilian population.67
Yet it was not this asymmetry, but rather deploying the Army
to the conflict, that changed the course of Army transformation. To
counter Serbian tactics, the US Army deployed AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters, along with associated logistics and force protection support,
to a base in Albania from which to launch more effective attacks against
Serbian armor. The deployment soon devolved into a debacle. Facilities
in and around the airfield were insufficient for the massive logistic
requirements of the aviation unit. Two Army aviators were killed and
their helicopters destroyed in a training accident while preparing for
the specific requirements of the operation. By the time the aviation unit
was in place and ready to operate, the war was over—Operation Allied
Force had ended and Slobodan Milosevic had capitulated.68 Things got
worse when a succeeding American armored force, Task Force Falcon,
deployed into Kosovo to execute stability operations as part of Operation
Joint Guardian. Streets were clogged with refugees and bridges could not
support 70-ton M1 Abrams tanks; the deployment ground to a crawl.69
Critics used the episode to argue that the Army was too heavy and too
slow, rapidly becoming irrelevant to modern warfare.70 This event had an
especially large impact on Army transformation since the operation was
overseen by Lieutenant General John Hendrix, commanding general,
V Corps, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, who later became the
commander of US Army Forces Command, and because on June 22,
1999, only weeks after this fiasco, Shinseki became the 34th chief of
staff of the Army.71
From the beginning of his tenure, Shinseki had a very clear vision
for the future of Army transformation.72 He would create a whole new
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67      Millett, Maslowski, and Feis, Common Defense, 12417–441.
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(1999): 15–21, doi:10.1080/04597239908461105.
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organization, the Interim Force.73 The first purpose of the Interim Force
was to provide an organization for testing the tactics and structure of
an eventual Objective Force. But the force also had another purpose: to
cure the Army’s deployability woes.74 The Interim Force—equipped with
medium-weight, 20-ton armored vehicles—would fill the gap between
heavy forces, which were lethal, mobile, and survivable, but took months
to get to a theater of operations, and light forces, which were rapidly
deployable but not survivable or self-sustaining beyond a few days. The
Interim Force would have the deployability of light forces and be able
to leverage the technology from the RMA to provide the lethality and
staying power of heavy forces. Moreover, this transformation was not
going to happen in 2025. Shinseki wanted the first interim BCTs fielded
in three years.75
To head the actual training, manning, and equipping of the
teams, Shinseki chose Dubik. The first two brigades chosen for the
transformation were at Fort Lewis, Washington. One armor brigade
and one light infantry brigade were selected so the new doctrine could
benefit from the best practices of each type of force. Hendrix and
Abrams directly supervised Dubik’s efforts.76
In a massive bureaucracy like the Army, adopting a new combat
system—let alone an entirely new type of unit—usually takes a decade
or more. In that respect, the creation of the interim BCTs in only three
years was a masterpiece of strategic leadership worthy of its own study.77
But on a more fundamental level, the effort must be judged a failure. The
brigades did successfully bridge the deployability gap between light and
heavy forces; but they failed to bridge the more profound capability gap:
a lack of competency in low-intensity conflict.
The Interim Force was unequivocally designed for high-intensity
conflict. Even with the benefit of hindsight, when asked directly if the
interim BCTs were intended to address shortfalls in executing operations
other than war, Shinseki still insists they were intended to dominate
“conventional” operations.78 Dubik, as well as the documentary evidence
from the time confirms this stance. The organizational and operational
concept, which served as the blueprint for developing the interim BCTs,
repeatedly claimed the units would be a “full spectrum, combat force.” 79
But the concept also acknowledged the interim BCT was “designed
and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency
operations” (smaller high-intensity conflicts).80 These teams could only
succeed in “stability and support operations” (low-intensity conflicts)
with significant “augmentations.” Moreover, even with augmentation,
73      John Sloan Brown (former director, General Eric K. Shinseki’s Special Staff Study Group
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September 1, 2000.
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they were only capable of serving in stability and support operations
“as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for
stability forces.”81 This concept was the reemergence of Dubik’s national
judicial force, a hypothetical “other” force that would arrive to do the
dirty work of navigating the political dimension of low-intensity conflict
so that the Army would not have to do so.82
The concept paid little attention to concerns over urban operations
and asymmetry, repeatedly insisting the design to dominate in “urban and
complex terrain” and acknowledging the future operating environment
would entail “asymmetry.”83 But the conflation of “urban and complex
terrain” is telling. The organizational and operational concept never
connected urban operations to dealing with a population or the loss
of information dominance. Moreover, “urban and complex terrain”
was simply terrain that was complicated, an obstacle to movement
and observation that would be overcome by superior mobility and
networks.84 Likewise, asymmetry was stripped of its messy association
with urban operations, guerilla warfare, and civilian populations.
Instead it was defined in terms of enemy technologies that could deny
access to a theater of operations or produce mass US casualties.85 The
interim BCT was a giant leap toward greater deployability and lethality,
but it did not solve the problem of low-intensity conflict, particularly the
political dimension, which transformation’s critics identified as the true
asymmetry of urban operations.
In fact, the Army never solved the problems of low-intensity
conflict or its political dimension. Thus, when the twin towers fell on
September 11, 2001, the stage was set for a slow-motion military disaster.
The apparent “cheap win” in Afghanistan through special operations
forces and airpower further validated transformers’ convictions that
technology could supplant numbers.86 The Army that invaded Iraq in
March 2003 was tragically ill-prepared for the character of warfare that
it ultimately faced. While the depleted Iraqi Army rapidly melted before
the advance of the vastly superior American Army, it did not disappear.
Instead, the Iraqi soldiers hid among the population, evading America’s
high-tech surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Once Saddam’s
regime was toppled, the Iraqi Army reemerged, not as a conventional
military threat but as an insurgency that severely challenged America’s
halting efforts to establish a new Iraqi government. Other adversaries
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also emerged, including Shia militias, Sunni extremists, and foreign
terrorist groups.87
America continues to pay the price for its Army’s initial unpreparedness for the low-intensity conflict in Iraq. The Army also remains
engaged in other low-intensity conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan. The
Army has resumed its headlong march toward ever-greater capability
to fight high-intensity conflicts. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the
Army has been asked to fight less than 30 total days of high-intensity
conflict. In this same period, it has been asked to fight dozens of lowintensity conflicts, many running years in duration. It is time that the
Army reshaped itself not only to fight and win the nation’s battles but
to fight and win the nation’s wars—including the messy postconflict
stability phase of future wars.
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